Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/273



1. The difficulties inherent in developing, implementing and sustaining a program designed to produce a stable, viable. government in South Viet-Nam, under the limitations imposed by current U.S o national policy, are recognized. However, recent recommendations from the field for revision of such programs must be considered in the nature of delaying or interim actions which can be justified only if they are undertaken with a positive objective, i.e., to gain time for consolidation or development of a favorable situation in the same area of elsewhere. Although proposed interim notions in Viet-Nam may be justifiable from the point of view of minimizing the psychological impact of the eventual loss of the remainder of Viet-Nam to the Communist Bloc, it is considered that ultimate failure of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam, even though limited by the extent of the U.S. commitment, would have the effect of furthering the loss of U.S. prestige in Asia.


 * Interim or delaying actions in South Viet-Nam should be accompanied by development of a favorable situation in the remainder of the Far East in general and in Southeast Asia in particular as pertains to Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

2. The implementation of current U.S. policy and programs in South Viet-Nam and to a great extent in Cambodia and Laos is effected by the ability of the French to negate within these countries the accomplishment of U.S. objectives. The complex and flexible policies currently being followed by the French will not insure the continued cooperation and support necessary for the successful accomplishment of U.S. programs. France is pledged to and is supporting a policy of internal sovereignty for the Copyofcopies Rh