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 : 1. Direct U.S. military aid and support programs at the rapid and efficient development of indigenous forces, particularly Thailand and Cambodia. Any U.S. military aid program in the latter should contingent upon U.S. control of the organization and training of Cambodian forces.

2. Obtain a firm statement of French policy relating to Viet-Nam; inform the French that the U.S. will expect complete French support in the implementation of U.S. programs in South Viet-Nam.

3. Obtain from the Department of State, an immediate and practical solution to the problem of Bao Dai. (From a Defense point of view, he should be a figurehead only, with a minimum amount of control over the Viet-Nam Government).

4. Accept General Collins' recommendations on alternatives to the current Vietnamese Government but make certain that the problem of the Sects is also considered concurrently.

5. Regardless of whether Diem or alternative government is in power, it should be understood that the Binh Xuyen will immediately be stripped of all power and subjugated to the National Government; that the government will include representation from the other Sects; and that these other Sects will eventually be completely subjugated to the National Government.

6. in re-evaluating curent or establishing new U.S. objectives in South Viet-Nam insure adequate consideration of Viet Minh capabilities rather than possible intentions.

7. Determine U.S. military action within the scope of the SEACDF in order to prevent the loss οf the remainder of Southeast Asia as a result of the loss of South Viet-Nam.

8. Mark every effort to abolish or postpone indefinitely the elections proposed for Viet-Rem, under the Geneva Accords, for July 1956. Copy of copies. Rh