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 * To re-examine the current implementation of U.S. policy pertaining to South Viet-Nam in light of current events related to that area.


 * TAB A.


 * 1. Interim or delaying actions in South Viet-Nam should be accompanied by development or a favorable situation in the remainder of the Far East in general and in Southeast Asia in particular as pertains to Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

2. The successful accomplishment of บ.S. programs for South Viet-Nam cannot be assured through French implementation of such programs as the French will only accept the concept of these programs insofar as they further French policy in the area.

3. The influence of Bao Dai in his position as Chief of State is a constant menace to the successful implementation of U.S. programs in South Viet-Nam.

4. Alternatives to the Diem Government should be given adequate consideration in the event the U.S. cannot longer reasonably support Diem.

5. A strong, stable, viable government cannot be developed in South Viet-Nam until a reasonable solution to the problem of the Sects has been determined.

6. The Viet Minh are capable, even without resorting to overt aggression, of preventing the total accomplishment of U.S. objectives in South Viet-Nam.

7. The military defense of Viet-Nam would be extremely difficult if not impossible should: The FEC withdraw from South Viet-Nam and no other forces be immediately available to fill the vacuum; the Viet-Minh then overtly intervene; and no U.S. ground forces be included in "other" forces ultimately used to fill the vacuum.

8. The loss of Viet-Nam and subsequent political developments would render the military defense or the remainder of Southeast Asia extremely difficult, if not impossible.

9. It is questionable that South Viet-nam could at this time win an election pertaining to the unification of Viet-Nam. Rh Rh