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 closely with mine. Cur lose collaboration as confirmed in December by the Secretary of State and the French Premier after their meeting in Washington.

. The seven-point program we evolved was as follows:

(1) Vietnamese Armed Forces

(a) Agreement to be reached with French and Vietnamese on the size, composition and mission of the forces.

(b) Assumption by MAAG of full responsibility for training Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(c) Full autonomy to be granted to Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(d) National Army support, and subordination to, Vietnamese Government to be assured.

(e) Employment of National Army in National Security Action (pacification and anti-subversion program).

(2) Strengthening and broadening of Diem Government.

(3) Relocation of refugees and their absorption into the national economy.

(4) Agrarian reform, particularly those phases designed to get refugees onto the land and restore all untilled lands to cultivation.

(5) Establishment of a National Assembly.

(6) Financial and economic measures designed to strengthen the economy, meet U.S. requirements for receiving direct American aid and to support other points of the program.

(7) Education and training, particularly in the field of public administration.

. It was agreed that as progress was achieved in each field a calculated effort would be made to give major credit to President Diem for such progress. Diem would make the public announcements through an improved end expanded Vietnamese Public Information Service. I charged the chief of our USIS with the implementation of this most important aspect of our program. Rh