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Rh (2) From nearly every point of view, "free" Vietnam appeared heeded toward absorption by the Viet Minh, whether through a French-managed accommodation with the Communists or through the restoration of a scarcely-veiled colonial system in South Vietnam which could have been sustained against the Viet Minh only by the weight of arms which, paradoxically, the French had made clear they had no intention of using.

2. In his letter of November 1, 1954, instructing me to undertake a special mission to Vietnam, the President said he was ordering me to Saigon for a limited period to coordinate and direct U.S. activities in Vietnam in support of U.S. policy objectives To that end, he gave me broad authority to direct, utilize and control all agencies of the U.S. Government in that country. My immediate task was to attempt to check a rapidly deteriorating situation in Vietnam and to help Diem's Government establish internal security and political stability throughout its territories. The emergency, rather than the long range, aspects of U.S policy in Vietnam were designated the principal task of my mission.

3. . . I was soon impressed with the fact that the National Army was the key to success or failure in Vietnam. The Army was under the command of an avowed enemy of the Diem Government. So long as the Government could not rely on the Army, it was powerless not only against the General Staff but also against the sects, each with its private army and special interests, and even more importantly against the Viet Minh who stood in a fair way to win Vietnam south of the 17th parallel through subversion. Accordingly, my initial efforts were directed toward preparing recommendations on the National Army which had to be dealt with before any of the other urgent problems of Vietnam could be solved. Fortunately, shortly after my arrival, General Hinh obeyed the orders Bao Dai had been prevailed upon to issue, and left Vietnam for France, as I had urged him to do. Hinh' departure removed some of the aspects.of crisis from the National Army program but did not rob it of its importance as the nation's most urgent problem.

. In accord with the French Commissioner General Ely, I proceeded thereafter to draw up a seven-point program of action to which I proposed to devote the limited period of my mission in Vietnam. I had consulted Ely in detail as this program was being drawn up, and had obtained his concurrence and the cooperation of his staff members who worked Rh