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Jan 5 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT ClITEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of U. S. Military Programs in Southeast Asia

1. In a recent cable (DA IN 105690) General J. Lawton Collins indicated that Premier Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam does not have the capacity to unify the divided factions in Vietnam and that unless action is taken to achieve such unity the country will be lost to Communism. He further stated that if measures to strengthen the government were unacceptable to the U. S., or were unsuccessful, the U. S. should re-evaluate its plans for assisting Southeast Asia. In addition, it is apparent that if the 1956 Vietnam elections are held, the Communists will probably emerge victorious. The political decision with respect to General Collins' recommendation has not yet been made.

2. In message No. 2585 dated 24 December 1954 to the American Embassies in Paris and Saigon, the Secretary of State was more optimistic and expressed the view that progress had been made in South Vietnam during the past five months.

3. Referenced communications indicate a delicate and unstable situation within South Vietnam. Under these circumstances, it is necessary that the Department of Defense be prepared for any eventuality; hence it is prudent that all the implications of possible courses of action be examined. Accordingly, it is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their views and recommendations on the following points as well as any other which they deem appropriate.

a. Assuming aid is cut off, the effect of this action upon the ability of the armed forces and the Government of Vietnam to maintain internal security in South Vietnam.

b. Assuming minimal aid is to be given, the nature and extent of the military aid required, and the period for which it should be granted.

c. Force levels for the FEC which would enable them, in conjunction with available Vietnamese forces, to safeguard the evacuation from Vietnam of U. S. equipment. SecDef Cont. No. TS-0786Rh