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Subject: Indochina

Mr. Robertson and I went to see the Secretary this morning about beginning direct aid to Viet-Ham in January and moving ahead with MAAG negotiations in Cambodia.

1. The Secretary decided we should proceed as scheduled and "take the plunge" on January 1. Mr. Robertson and I stated the pros and cons. Mr. Robertson pointed out our prestige would be considerably more committed in the three Associated states and our ability to disengage made more difficult by this step. On the other hand, I pointed out it would give us more leverage, put our missions on a direct footing and carry out the understanding reached with the French and the three Associated States last September and October. I explained to the Secretary that Governor Stassen had set up an operational mechanism which would keep our direct aid fluid, and flexible so that it could be tapered up or down quickly depending on developing circumstances. Mr. Robertson stressed that no amount of aid would be announced at this time or conveyed to the governments concerned. The Secretary indicated his approval of this general line or approach. that the program would be subject to discontinuance at any time, as at present.

2. With respect to the JCS prerequisite on elimination of the French in Cambodia, the Secretary stated that it was much too legalistic and unrealistic. It is the kind of thing that could get us into a great deal of complication without sufficient compensating advantages. He felt that this was the sort of problem which could be only handled in time and by various methods. To attack it so directly would only create much more of a problem.

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