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TOP SECRET 3. The task of the United States in coping with this situation is further complicated by:


 * . The vulnerability of the non-Communist countries in the area militarily, and in varying degrees, politically, economically, and psychologically, to further Communist expansionist efforts.


 * . The deep-seated national antagonisms and differing assessments of national interest which divide these countries from each other and severely hamper efforts to combine their collective resources for their own defense and welfare.


 * . The intense nationalistic feelings, fed by residual resentments against European colonialism coupled with a widespread feeling of weakness and inadequacy in the face of the worldwide power struggle, which inhibit many of these countries from operating closely with, the United States.


 * . The divergencies on Far Eastern policy with our European allies, principally with respect to our posture toward China, which limit the extent of political and economic pressures which can be maintained against the Asian Communist regimes without divisive effects on the basic United States-led coalition.


 * NOTE: In addition to the foregoing general considerations, attention is directed to NIE 13-54, "Communist China's Power Potential Through 1957," published June 3, 1954, and NIE 10-7-54, "Communist Courses of Action in Asia Through 1957," published November 23, 1954.

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