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 ""Toward the last stages of the war in Indochina, those who opposed intervention … expounded the principle that two conditions were necessary to justify our intervention: First, that the local government must exercise effective control; and second, that the local population must be friendly to the United states. In reality, this principle is largely a paraphrase of the position developed in the State Department's 'China White Paper' … to explain our failure to prevent the loss of the mainland of China to the Communists. Moreover, it must be pointed out that it is a very dangerous doctrine that invites explanations for future failures and defeats. Its greatest danger is that it overlooks a prime responsibility of leadership, i.e., to strive to create conditions favor role for positive action.""

6. : -- Our defeat is unnecessary. There are large indigenous material and human resources in the area which can be developed and harnessed in the event of hostilities with Red China. Twice we let slip the "decisive strategic opportunity" of subtracting Communist China from the Soviet orbit, and thus beginning the rollback of Communist power in Korea and Indochina. When Chinese communist aggression starts again, as it undoubtedly will, we must be prepared to strike back and seize that strategic opportunity.

7. : Considered separately, the problems of Korea, Formosa, Japan and the Philippines appear insoluble except through ultimate defeat; for these countries are in the line of march for communist conquest. On the other hand, considered as a regional area, linked to U.S. influence and power, they have assets of great present value, and even greater potential value. [General Van Fleet then analyzes the actual and potential strengths of these countries, emphasizing the role they might play in a united offensive with the U.S. against Communist China].

8. : Despite the real and potential free world strength in Asia, we have continued to suffer one defeat after another. Our failure in the Far East is one of leadership; it is a failure to consolidate Free World resources of the Far East and make of those consolidated resources an instrument of Free World power and influence. We have failed to create conditions for the development of a strong, friendly role by Japan. We have failed to solve the Japanese-Korean problem. We have failed to solve the Japan-Philippines reparations problem. Our technical assistance and economic aid programs have been inadequate. Our educational and exchange programs have been weak and inadequate. Above all, we have failed to develop for ourselves a firm policy for the Far East, to decide what sort of a position we wish to build there. Under our present national security policies in the Far East, we are in no position to solve the dilemna, save by compromise built on compromise. Equally, we cannot redress the balance in Asia if we give Britain and France a veto over our policies in the area. Rh