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Pageof telegram to carry out above quoted U.S.-French agreement. While Ely seems to have attempted honestly carry out this agreement, fact that many French elements have never accepted Diem solution must have weakened Ely's efforts and encouraged Hinh camarilla in its recalcitrance. PAREN In this connection see Paris 1665 UNPAREN. We remain of opinion that military personalities now opposing Diem are more susceptible to French pressure and influence than any other similarly powerful elements in Viet-Nam.

Broad government of national union around Didm has not been achieved. Until the current civil-military-sect conflict is resolved any successor Prime Minister would be faced with substantially similar problem with which he might be even less able to cope than Diem, except on conditions prejudiceprejudicial to establishment of integrity.

2. Current jockeying for power and struggle for cabinet positions is resulting in paralyzing impasse. Positive moves are necessary by France and the U.S. if this impasse is to be broken. We remain convinced that if anything is to be saved in Viet-Nam we cannot sacrifice indispensable qualities of honesty, incorruptibility and nationalism represented more conspicuously at this moment by Diem than by anyone else.

3. Mendes-France's use of term QUOTE another structure of government UNQUOTE suggests French hankering to reestablish political system similar to that of 1946 Cochinchinese Republic, founded on police and military power to be exercised by such figures as Tam and Hinh. In addition to such pro-French figures, system might involve direct colonial-type controls by French. Such a formula in French eyes would have advantage of facilitating elimination of Bao Dai and non-Cochinchinese elements like Diem. A development of this sort in our view would create in Rh South46395