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 numbers of French personnel. In view of this limitation and the resulting prohibition of establishment of a U.S. MAAG to supervise such MDAP aid so may be granted, no recommendations are made at this time as to force levels for Laos. However, Laos is capable of supporting armed forces of 12–15,000.

6. An examination of the estimated costs involved in creating and maintaining these forces will reveal that approximately $240 million for Vietnam and $54 million for Cambodia, is for pay and allowances of the indigenous personnel. This is computed at the prevailing national scales and may be reduced but only through negotiations with the respective governments to reduce pay and allowance. Slight saving in the first year maintenance cost may be possible also if sufficient quantities of spares and replacement equipment become available in Indochina. This can be determined only after completion of an inventory following the evacuation of the Tonkin Delta. Despite any major reduction that may be accomplished by these means, U.S. support to this area should not be allowed to impair the development of effective and reliable allied forces elsewhere.

7. With reference to the question of training Vietnamese forces the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out that in addition to the current unstable political situation in Vietnam the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement have been interpreted to limit the strength of MAAG, Indochina to 342 military personnel. Even if all these military personnel were replaced by U.S. civilians to perform the normal functions of the MAAG and the military personnel were thereby released for training duties only, the number of U.S. military personnel would permit only limited participation in the over-all training program. Under these conditions, U.S. participation in training not only would probably have but limited beneficial effect but also would assume responsibility for any failure of the program. In light of the foregoing and from a military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should not participate in the training of Vietnamese forces in Indochina. However, if it is considered that Rh