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Rh difficulties and impediments in any such program of U.S. training and assistance for Vietnamese forces. Nevertheless, within these difficulties and limitations, I feel there are many reasons to consider a vigorous, imaginative and effective program for planning, developing and training Vietnamese security forces both in Viet-Nam and perhaps even in nearby countries or in the United States itself. We could substantially influence the development of political, as well as military stability in free Viet-Nam of we had such a training project with Vietnamese forces. The provision of direct budgetary support to these forces would haver far less impact if the United States eschews any participation in training these forces.

Then there is the question if timing regarding the degree of political stability which the Joint Chiefs of Staff raised in their memorandum of September 22, 1954. I believe that potential political developments now warrant your consideration of the necessary preliminary steps for working out an appropriate U.S. training function for Vietnamese security forces.

With respect to these considerations regarding force goals and training in Viet-Nam, we need to take some decisions promptly to enable us to respond to the Cambodian, Vietnamese, and French Governments concerning financial and other support for their forces in Indochina.

The President has signed a letter to the Prime Minister of Viet-Nam authorizing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with him an intelligent program of direct American aid to assist Viet-Nam. A similar letter has already been delivered to the King of Cambodia. In the meantime the Vietnamese Government has submitted a note to this Government stating that it is considering increasing the Vietnamese army to a total force of 230,000 men in order to "guarantee the internal and external security of the country" and requesting United States assistance in this endeavor. The French Finance Minister in his recent talks in Washington expressed a desire for U.S. financial support for the French Expeditionary Corps in Indochina, which the French contemplate retaining at an average strength of about 150,000 men during 1955. The United States representatives indicated that we would strive to give some indication to the French Government of our thinking on these matters by December 1, 1954. The plans of the French and the Vietnamese both seem to me to be beyond what the United States should consider feasible to support for maintaining the security of Free Indochina at this time.

In view of the political considerations and the requirements of timing, it is imperative that the United States Government prepare a firm position on the size of the forces we consider a minimum level to assure the internal security of Indochina. This position will also have to include the amounts of money we will be prepared to make available for this purpose, and the steps we will be willing to take to assist in the training and formation of these forces. It seems to me that we cannot realistically enter into discussion with the other governments concerned until we have made this determination. I would therefore also appreciate your views on how best we should proceed in making this determination.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Governor Stasson.

Rh Rh