Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/113

 Rh

Dear Mr. Secretary:

With reference to the enclosures from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in your letter of September 28, there are several important political and poly aspects of both the manpower and cost-estimates of force goals for the Associated State totalling about $536,400,000, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reservations on the support and training of Vietnamese forces.

With respect to the magnitude of force levels and costs for Viet-Nam and Cambodia, I believe that United States policy should be based on NSC 5429/2, which envisages the maintenance in Indochina of forces necessary to assure the internal security of the area, and upon the arrangements concluded at Manila to deter aggression in Southeast Asia. The concepts underlying the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty should make the maintenance of relatively large ground forces unnecessary in the Associated States, since the military establishment of a single state within such a collective security group need not be so large as would be required if that nation had to act alone to defend its security against external aggression. It seems to me that the mission of the Vietnamese National Armed Forces should be to provide internal security. The manpower and cost estimates in the JCS attachment would seem to be excessive in the above context.

From the political viewpoint some armed forces are necessary. If adequately trained and equipped they would give the people of free Viet-Nam with an increased sense of stability. This would produce definite political and psychological advantages and would help fulfill the objectives of NSC 5429/2. I would appreciate having your views as to the forces we should contemplate to carry out this policy as well as the amount of funds we should devote to this purpose.

With respect to the question of U.S. support and training for the Vietnamese forces there are two political aspects: purposes and timing. Effective execution of NSC policy on U.S. support for such forces can have a significant bearing on the political objective of creating a stable, capable anti-Communist government in Viet-Nam, and on assisting it in carrying out a vigorous internal program with Congressional approval. One effective way to strengthen the Vietnamese Government is to assist in the reorganizing and training of its armed forces, as I noted in my letter to you of August 13, 1954. This point was again referred to in the Acting Secretary's letter of September 7, 1954, to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In addition to budgetary support, a direct means of helping to create and maintain political stability will be by appropriate participation of the U.S. MAAG in the planning, developing and training of Vietnamese security forces. The Department of State is aware of the risks, The Honorable Charles E. Wilson Secretary of DefenseRh