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TOP SECRET what will be widely regarded in Asia as a Communist victory/ Should Indochina be lost to the Communists, and in the absence of immediate and effective counteraction by the free world (which would of necessity be on a much greater scale than that required to be decisive in Indochina), the conquest of the remainder of Southeast Asia would inevitably follow. Thereafter, longer term results, probably forcing Japan into an accommodation with the Communist bloc, and threatening the stability and security of Europe, could be expected to ensue.

F. As a measure of U. S. participation in the Indochinese war it is noted that the U. S. has since 1950 programmed in excess of $2.4 billion dollars in support of the French Associated States operations in Indochina. France is estimated to have expended during the period 1945–1953 the equivalent of some $5.4 billion. This investment, in addition to the heavy casualties sustained by the French and Vietnamese, to say nothing of the great moral and political involvement of the U. S. and French, will have been fruitless for the anti-Communist cause if control of all or a potion of Indochina should now be ceded to the Communists.

III.

A. NSC 5405 approved January 16, 1954 states U. S. policy with respect to Indochina

B. The French desire for peace in Indochina almost at any cost represents our greatest vulnerability in the Geneva talks.

IV.

For the views of the JCS see Tab A.

V.

A. Loss of Indochina to the Communists would constitute a political and military setback of the most serious consequences and would almost certainly lead to the ultimate Communist domination of all of Southeast Asia.

B. The U. S. policy and objectives with respect to Southeast Asia as reflected in NSC 5405 remain entirely valid in the light of developments since that policy was approved

C. With respect to possible alternative courses of action enumerated in paragraph IIA above, the Department of Defense has reached the following conclusions: Rh