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 TOP SECRET

I.

To develop a U. S. position with reference to the Geneva Conference as it relates to Indochina, encompassing the military implications of certain alternatives which might arise in connection with that conference.

II.

A. The Department of Defense and the JCS have reviewed NSC 5405 in the light of developments since that policy was approved from a military point of view and in the light of certain possible courses of action as they affect the Geneva Conference. These are:




 * 1. || Maintenance of the status quo in Indochina.
 * 2. || Imposition of a cease-fire in Indochina.
 * 3. || Establishment of a coalition government.
 * 4. || Partition of the country.
 * 5. || Self-determination through free elections.
 * }
 * 4. || Partition of the country.
 * 5. || Self-determination through free elections.
 * }
 * }

B. The Department of Defense and the JCS have also considered the impact of the possible future status of Indochina on the remainder of Southeast Asia and Japan and have consider e d the effect which any substantial concessions to the Communists on the part of France and the Associated States would have with respect to Asian peoples as a whole and U. S. objectives in Europe.

C. Indochina is the area in which the Communists and non-Communist worlds confront one another actively on the field of battle. The loss of this battle by whatever means would have the most serious repercussions on U. S. and free world interests, not only in Asia but in Europe and elsewhere.

D. French withdrawal or defeat in Indochina would have most serious consequences on the French position in the world; the free world position in Asia; and in the U. S. on the domestic attitude vis-a-vis the French. It would, furthermore, constitute a de facto failure on the part of France to abide by its commitment in U. N. to repel aggression.

E. Unless the free world maintains its position in Indochina, the Communists will be in a position to exploit Rh