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effects which the introduction of a ROKA division into Indochina might have. Since the substance of President Rhee's offer has now bee n publicized, certain psychological benefits have probably already been realized. The political factors involved cannot be finally evaluated unless and until the reactions of our Allies in Korea are determined.

6. President Rhee does not have at his command the resources required to initiate and subsequently to support his proposed project. The French Government has repeatedly indicated that it is unable to increase above the present level its contribution to the Indochina conflict. Therefore, the material support of the project would inevitably devolve upon the United States. It follows that no matter how President Rhee's offer is presented, and no matter what the proclaimed attitude of the United States Government might be, the sponsorship of the project would be generally ascribed to the United States in the eyes of the world,

7. It is not possible to predict with any degree of dependability hat the reaction of Communist China would be to the introduction of a ROKA division into Indochina. While a decision on the part of Communist China to intervene overtly in Indochina is more likely to be governed by other considerations, the entry of ROK forces into the Indochinese conflict might precipitate overt intervention by the Chinese Communists. In view of publicly announced United States policy, i.e., that open Red Chinese aggression in Indochina would have "…grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina." (See paragraph 4, Annex "A" to NSC 5405), implementation of President Rhee's offer could have grave military implications involving United States armed forces.

8. A direct and exclusive offer of a ROKA division to Laos would probably be regarded by the governments of the other Associated States and of France as an affront, and could cause serious embarrassment in the matter of command relationships. Furthermore, should the forces invading Laos be withdrawn by the Communists as was done in the previous instance, the employment of a ROKA division solely in Laos could develop into unprofitable garrison duty even though it freed other forces for active operations elsewhere in Indochina. Therefore, if President Rhee's offer is to be formally made, it should be addressed individually and simultaneously to the governments of France, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam with the stipulation that the ROKA division would be made available to the Commander of the French Union forces in Indochina for employment subject only to the condition that the integrity of the division be maintained. Rh