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 10. The French and Vietnamese Navies are fully employed to the limit of their capabilities in transporting troops and supplies, amphibious operations, mine sweeping, shipping reconnaissance, blockade and patrol, and training. There are insufficient personnel and small craft to permit progressive maintenance, or rotation of crews from hazardous and exacting duties.

11. While approximately three fourths of all naval operations are currently taking place in the Tonkin Delta area, less than half the personnel of the F.U. Navies is assigned there. Eschewing criticism, it still appears that the staffs and easy billets in the Saigon area are overmanned. Requests from the North for personnel and additional ISU's to discharge missions assigned have not been heeded by Admiral Anboyneau, CINC, FE.

12. There is an obvious lack of coordination in joint operations, and small craft troop convoys in ambush country have not received either observation or air support, either of which would normally ensure a safe journey, barring the ever present threat of mines.

13. Casualties in both ships and personnel continue unabated, testimony to the efficacy of point blank bazooka fire and new mine tactics (Sec Annex A).

The French Naval Air squadron of Privateers is a first class aggregation of pilots and crews. They provide the only night bombing potential in Indochina, and engage in varied operational tasks suited to the PB4Y

14. The French light carrier "Arromanche" provides close air support, photo reconnaissance and armed reconnaissance sorties in answer to requests from GATAC. Rh