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TOP SECRET :. The effect on the position of France itself in North Africa, in Europe, and as a world power.


 * . The free world stake in Indochina.


 * . The impact of the loss of Indochina upon the over-all strategy of France's free world partners.

26. Reiterate to tho French:


 * . That in the absence of a marked improvement in the military situation there is no basis for negotiation with any prospect for acceptable terms.


 * . That a nominally non-Communist coalition regime would eventually turn the country over to Ho Chi Minh with no opportunity for the replacement of the French by the United States or the United Kingdom.

27. Flatly oppose any idea of a cease-fire as a preliminary to negotiations, because such a cease-fire would result in an irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position in Indochina.

28. If it appears necessary, insist that the French consult the Vietnamese and obtain their approval of all actions related to any response to Viet Minh offers to negotiate.

29. If the French actually enter into negotiations with the communists, insist that the United States be consulted and seek to influence the course of the negotiations. Rh