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1. Communist capabilities to oppose U.S. and intervention in Indochina are estimated on two assumptions: (a) Viet Minh alone, receiving indirect Chinese Communist aid; and (b) Chinese Communist and Viet Minh forces receiving Soviet support. However, this study does not consider the effect on enemy capabilities of U.S. counter-action or of enemy action not directed against Indochina. This assumption is very misleading, especially in view of the fact that national policy toward Southeast Asia (NSC 5405) in the event of Chinese Communist intervention calls for US military reaction not limited to the area of Indochina.

2. Under assumption (a) (Viet Minh alone), the Viet Minh will be capable of:


 * a. Maintaining guerrilla warfare throughout Indochina and mounting attacks in northern Indochina with a force of up to six divisions - almost complete logistic dependence on Chinese Communists.


 * b. Expanding the present combat forces of 290,000 by an additional 150,000.


 * c. Making air fields available, although the Viet Minh do not possess an air force.


 * d. Negligible naval activity.


 * e. Regarding political warfare, appealing to nationalism and denouncing U.S. intervention as colonialism; subverting and intimidating the Indochinese people. In spite of Allied victories, a hard core of Communists would remain.

3. Under assumption (b) (Chinese intervention), the Chinese Communists will be capable of:


 * a. Committing five of their thirteen armies (36,000 men each) within 10-20 days.


 * b. Supporting Communist combat forces, over present lines of communications, of 600.000 men. This capability exists in the dry or rainy season.


 * c. Intervening immediately with an air force of 120 aircraft (fighter and bomber).


 * d. Limited naval activity.


 * e. Regarding political warfare, infiltrating and conducting guerrilla warfare in support of Viet Minh activities.

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