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-2- 4607, May 30, 3 p.m. from Paris could remain over Haiphong for 20 minutes on each mission. A massive Chinese air attack (Schumann mentioned figure of 100 planes) could completely knock out French air capabilities in the delta and could so seriously damage the port of Haiphong that it would be impossible to conduct a successful withdrawal of French forces through the port. The loss of French air potential would drastically tip the scales in favor of the Viet Minh and make total defeat of French forces in the delta inevitable. It is against this eventuality that the French wish to have protection. Paragraph 9 of Embassy telegram 4605 indicates Ely's belief that he already has commitment from Admiral Radford on this type of attack. What French feel they are asking for now is not, in fact, a new commitment from US but assurances that US reaction will come within a matter of hours and even, if possible, in time to meet attacking Chinese planes. Schumann said he felt that only circumstances in which Chinese would make such an attack would be if they felt that US, for one reason or another, was not in a position to respond promptly and effectively. Therefore, Schumann suggested that if it should be impracticable to obtain preliminary approval of such military action from US Congress, it might be equally useful to have a clear warning from either the Secretary or the President that a massive Chinese air attack would meet with US opposition. Schumann said he felt certain that if Chinese realized that an air attack would cause US intervention they would never take the risk of mounting such an attack.

I have previously stated to Department that if we allowed delta to fall to the Viet Minh without a successful evacuation of the French expeditionary Corps, the effect here would be disastrous. If such a disaster should come about because of open Chinese Communist air attack to which we had not responded by US military action, the result here would be nothing short of catastrophic. We would have to count on a strong movement in France that could well be successful in favor of making peace at any price with the Soviets rather than continuing to count on US support through NATO. The effect of such action by France on the North Atlantic Alliance is obvious. In addition, I do not feel that we could exclude possibility, if the Soviets play their cards right, of a popular front government arising to carry out such a new policy. This naturally would incur the danger of an eventual Communist take-over in France. I do not have any means of evaluating effect in Asia of a unilateral US response to a Chinese attack, but Department should be constantly aware that lack of US response to a full-scale Chinese Communist air attack on the delta would place in jeopardy the North Atlantic Alliance and our whole position in Western Europe. 44009

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