Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.djvu/317



was raised by one of Eden's staff regarding the number of troops required to enforce the cessation of hostilities in Indochina. Various estimates were discussed. However, it was generally agreed that the number of troops required would be in excess of two divisions.

Since it is obvious that the conference is headed toward partition, I feel it significant to bring the foregoing information to your attention. There is very little that the Defense Department can do to influence the negotiations, since a political decision has been made that the U.S. will continue to participate even though we know that partition of Indochina, whatever form it may take, will ultimately result in its loss to the Communists. The view seems to prevail in the U.S. Delegation that there is very little the U.S. can do to influence the French and no useful purpose would be served in disassociating ourselves from the negotiations. I have little to offer in the way of recommendations. I have continued to point out the views of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of staff that from a military viewpoint a settlement in Indochina which results in leaving the Communist military forces intact will ultimately result in the loss of the area to Communist control. Also, there should be little doubt that there is no form of international supervision that will effectively stop further Communist infiltration and their eventual control of Indochina. Although there seems to be general agreement with the U.S. Delegation on these points there is a feeling that we cannot disassociate ourselves from the negotiations.

In outlining this gloomy situation I would like to mention one bright spot. As a result of your recommendations to General Smith I have been given every consideration and there has been complete cooperation. Due to the small number of U.S. representatives who can attend the restricted sessions on Indochina, I have not been to all of them. However, I have been included in all important discussions. Though there is obviously a difference in view between the Defense and State Department representatives here on Indochina, it is a frank, honest and friendly difference. I fully appreciate the State Department's difficulties, and though they share our view on what will ultimately result from partition, they feel compelled not to break with our Allies.

I shall keep you informed of further developments.

Rh