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 have to be taken to strengthen our allies. However, due to the overriding mobilization requirements for U.S. forces, such aid would be limited to those allies who could directly support the U.S. strategic concept for general war. This aid would further be limited to combat essential material, essential replacements, and spare parts which are beyond the capabilities of the individual countries to provide from their own or other allied resources.


 * 9.

Seek to create conditions by destroying effective Communist forces in Indochina, under which the Associated States Forces could assume responsibility for the defense of Indochina. In the light of this concept, the major courses of action which would be undertaken are as follows:


 * . in support of allied forces in . The employment of atomic weapons is contemplated in the event that such course appears militarily advantageous.


 * . Simultaneously, French Union Forces augmented by such armed forces of the Philippines and Thailand as may be committed would, in coordination with U.S. naval and Air Force forces, conduct coordinated ground, naval and air action to destroy enemy forces in Indochina.


 * 10.

The forces which would be employed under current plans during the initial phases of the above operation would include:


 * . French Union Forces currently operating in Indochina.


 * . A U.S. Fast Carrier Task Force and supporting forces as necessary in accordance with developments in the situation.


 * . U.S. Air Force units operating from present bases outside Indochina as required.


 * . Forces as may be contributed by other friendly nations.

The duration of commitment of these forces cannot be determined at this time. Rh