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French national sensitivity continues--particularly upon points of prestige. Although General Navarre has adopted many of the recommendations of Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel, USA, other recommendations pertaining to training, tactics, strategy, and logistics have not yet been fully implemented. In some cases the reasons for this lack of cooperation may be political in nature, and therefore beyond General Navarre's control. In summary, a renewed effort to obtain full support of the Navarre Plan and U.S. measures to support it, including those hereafter recommended, is essential.


 * . Approach the French with a proposal to organize a volunteer air group composed of personnel from various anti-communist nations or groups to serve with the French Union forces in Indochina as outlined in Appendix "A."


 * This examination was directed by the President at the NSC meeting of 8 January 1954. While the President emphasized participation by U.S. volunteer personnel he also mentioned the inclusion of other nationals . Since this is a definitive means by which the French can increase the Indochinese air effort as desired by them and thereby increase their over-all air capability this step is militarily desirable. Its feasibility is limited only by the provision of sufficient U.S. funds.


 * . Assign additional technical specialists to MAAG, Indochina, in accordance with the recommendations of the November O'Daniel report, so as to maximize technical assistance to the French Union forces.


 * Additional technical advisory personnel are needed for MAAG, Indochina, to provide guidance and training to the French.


 * . Convince the French military authorities that it is imperative to increase unconventional warfare activities as suggested in Appendix "B," the substance of which is a broad general concept, for the use of guerrillas and can be used as the basis for discussions between General O'Daniel and authorities in Indochina in order to appropriately influence the French.


 * The present French unconventional warfare effort in Indochina is considered to be relatively ineffective.

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