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5. The force requirements and inherent logistic implications for a "static" defense of the remaining countries of Southeast Asia—Burma, Thailand, and Malaya are of the order of magnitude as shown in Appendices "A" and "B" hereto. So long as Burma and Thailand are not under Communist control, the geography of the area and the lack of a Chinese Communist capability for a major overseas attack renders Malaya secure from external attack. Therefore, the force requirements are limited to those necessary to defend Burma and Thailand and to provide internal security against infiltration and subversion in Malaya. Should Burma and Thailand be lost, to the Communists prior to an Allied decision to hold a line in Southeast Asia, the defensive position would have to be established in Malaya.

6. A study of the above requirements and implications reveals the following extensive and damaging weaknesses inherent in this concept:


 * . It is estimated that it would take a minimum of 12 months to build up the necessary base complex and facilities required to support the forces indicated.


 * . These forces would have to remain for an extended period.


 * . The commitment in manpower and material incident to maintaining these forces in Southeast Asia for such a period would be unacceptable from the overall viewpoint.


 * . The presence of large numbers of United States, Commonwealth, and French troops in this area would provide a basis for Communist propaganda to develop and intensify anti-Western sentiment.


 * . The dissipation of allied strength through the commitment of forces of this magnitude to a "static" defense of Southeast Asia would contribute to the realization of the politico-military objectives of the USSR vis-a-vis the free world.


 * . Execution of static defense plan would result in maldeployment and seriously reduce the flexibility of employment of United States forces. This could seriously jeopardize the United States capability of supporting logistically our present war plans.

7. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that from the military viewpoint the concept of a static-type defense is unsound. Rh