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 * . The: implication of a reaction by the Chinese Communists in the event of U.S. participation.


 * . Atomic weapons will be used whenever it is to our military advantage.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the basic principle underlying any command structure for operations in Indochina which is acceptable to the United States must enable the U.S. to influence future strategy in Indochina. In addition, they believe that some new means to furnish the military guidance which heretofore has come from Paris must be found. A possible solution for over-all strategic guidance is a Military Representative Committee with membership from those nations contributing the principal forces of the coalition with a steering or standing group along the lines of NATO. This group would be served by a staff organized along the lines of the U.S. Joint Staff composed primarily of U.S. and French officers.

4. Although the Allied Commander in Chief in Indochina should be French, there must be a U.S. Deputy with sufficient staff assistance to provide liaison with the French and coordinate U.S. activities with the over-all operations CINCPAC would exercise command over-all U.S. forces based in Indochina and other forces assigned to him for operations in Indochina. In addition, a U.S. Air Advisor would be provided the French Commander in Chief for the purpose of advising him concerning the air effort.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the best military course for eventual victory in Indochina in the development of effective native armed forces. Thus far the French have been unsuccessful in their efforts to develop such forces. A firm commitment by the French and firm requests from the respective governments of the Associated States for the training and development of native forces by the United States should be a prerequisite of U.S. participation. It is estimated that an augmentation of MAAG Indochina on the order of 2250, with an appropriate logistic support force, would be required to initiate this program. The size of this force and security arrangements therefore will be determined in light of recommendations requested from CINCPAC and Chief, MAAG Indochina. Rh