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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 4440, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 257

EYES ONLY UNDERSECRETARY

DEPARTMENT LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Re DEPTEL 4130

I have been much concerned about EDC situation for some time. Two things are perfectly clear.

1. That as long as present state of acute crisis exists regarding Indochina there is no hope of a successful debate on EDC. The singleminded effort for a period of at least two weeks of all pro-EDC elements in government will be necessary in order to have chance of ratification of EDC by French Parliament.

2. Any attempt to force EDC to a vote before Indochina crisis has been further clarified would lead to indefinite postponement or defeat of EDC.

While pro-ECDEDC [sic] members of French Government originally saw no connection between EDC and Geneva, the fall of Dien Bien Phu and present military crisis in Indochina has drastically changed situation. EDC is for the moment inextricably intertwined with both Geneva and Franco-US negotiations regarding united action in Indochina. While there is no direct logical connection between the two, the way in which we handle present Indochina negotiations with French is bound to have great effect on our friends in French Government who are supporting EDC. The two key elements in this situation are (1) the finding of a solution to the clarification of the independence of Associated States that will not require France to publicly proclaim right of withdrawal from French union and (2) the question of Marines for Indochina as raised by Schumann in EMBTEL 4416. Unless we can satisfy this request for Marines, I am very much afraid that the emotional reaction here will be such that there will be no hope of EDC ratification at least for months to come. Indeed, if we Rh