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 -2- #4402, May 17, 2 p.m., from Paris The present situation in Indochina is in some ways comparable to that during the darkest early hours of the Korean war, when there was treachery and disaffection on all sides in South Korea, when the lines were being held primarily by American troops, and when a large part of world opinion regarded the South Korean Government as a US puppet. The real independence of the South Korean Government only became fully apparent when South Korea came into possession of an army of its own capable of independent action. I feel that independence of Vietnam will become perfectly clear after a strong national army has been created and after the bulk, if not all, of the French Expeditionary Corps has been withdrawn.

I would assume that the agreement which we will require regarding training of troops would give the US primary responsibility for the training and equipping of a Vietnamese national army. There has in the past been doubt as to the ability and good faith of the French military command in this direction. An agreement giving this responsibility to the US should remove these doubts and do more than anything else to make clear the independence of Vietnam. In addition, I would think it possible for the French to make some sort of statement saying that after peace had been established, and a Vietnamese national army had been established, it was their intention to withdraw the Expeditionary Corps. In this connection, the base rights which the French have in Laos by virtue of the recently negotiated Franco-Laotian treaty, and those which they expect to acquire in Vietnam by virtue of military conventions now under negotiation in Paris, even if they should be maintained, are of no more importance, and probably of less importance, than US base rights in the Philippine Republic. Such a statement would be in accordance with general desire in France to withdraw troops from Indochina and should be useful as assurance to Chinese Communists that non-Asian troops were being withdrawn from proximity to her frontiers.

When and if peace is restored in Indochina and Vietnam has a strong national army, it is obvious that the fundamental ties between Vie:am and France will be cultural, i.e., language, and whatever financial interest there may remain. Vietnam's association with the French Union will be based on a treaty freely negotiated between Sovereign States, and it is obvious that if Vietnam so desires, it will then be in a position to abrogate or nullify this treaty at any time it so desires. A public statement by Bao Dai that Vietnam's association with the French Union is the result of the free desire of the Vietnamese people might be helpful. If this 43917 Rh