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The first such grouping will include nations ready immediately to intervene in Indochina provided certain conditions are met. The second such grouping should be defined, with wider participation, to guarantee against Communist aggression or subversion, all of southeast Asia with the exception of Indo-China so long as active fighting continues.


 * . The smaller regional grouping, for active intervention, should consist of at least the U.S., France, the Associated States, Thailand and the Philippines. A precondition of its formation is the absolute declaration by France of the independence of the Associated States.


 * . The second regional grouping should be open to all countries who wish to join, including the Colombo countries, Korea and, perhaps, the Chinese Nationalists. The Asian members, definitely including the Colombo countries, would be invited to maintain the peace and security of the area of Indochina progressively liberated according to the procedures set forth below.


 * . Intervention in the Indochina conflict by the first regional grouping would be on invitation by the Associated States. Operations would be conducted from as many Vietnam held areas as possible to destroy organized Vietminh resistance therein and to develop a "front" which would delimit the areas of independent Vietnam. These areas would be expanded, as rapidly as was consistent with the destruction of organized Vietminh forces therein. As soon as a substantial, area was "liberated", the "active" regional grouping, i.e., the U.S. and France, would turn over the maintenance of order, anti-guerrilla operations and anti-subversion to the Vietnam Government assisted by the Asian members of the second and "peaceful" regional grouping. Military installations necessary to support active combat could be kept as "enclaves" within the liberated area.

8. The above concept, complicated though it may be, would seem to resolve to a considerable degree the problem of U.S. intervention being construed as "colonialism." It would further be an offer to the Colombo nations to guarantee the progressive settlement of Indochina by force of arms in which they are not asked to participate. It would clarify to the world that the U.S. means what is has frequently said, that the U.S. is determined that Communist expansion by aggressive force of arms shall not be permitted.

9. The concept, to be effective in halting the deterioration of the free world position in Indochina and at Geneva, would need to be publicly presented to the world, after the decision to do so was reached by the Executive Branch and Congress. It would have to be presented in its entirety to obtain the psychological as well as factual resolution of the "colonial" problem.

10. It is recommended that this concept be given appropriate study and further definition by the interested Departments and Agencies. Rh