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10 May 1954

In reply refer to I-11999

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: United States "Posture" at Geneva Conference

Captain Grant and I went over with Mr. Hensel the State Department "Draft Instructions to the U.S. Delegation at Geneva." We all agreed that as presently drafted they imply that the U.S. is at Geneva to "cheer the players" rather than to "pitch." The following specific comments are to raise the basic question with State, which is: are we in Geneva to try to the limit of our capacities to influence the outcome along the lines we want — or are we content to take a passive role? We think that to accept the latter is to accept defeat in advance.

1. Regarding para. 3, the United States, while not a "belligerent," is certainly vitally interested in the successful handling of the Indochina phase at Geneva. Again, while not technically a "principal" in the negotiation it would seem the U.S. should act from its position as the strongest nation in the free world and endeavor consistently to influence the progress of negotiations towards our objectives. Consequently" it is recommended that this paragraph be amended by the insertion of the word "vitally" before the words "interested nations" and the insertion of the word technically" before the words "a belligerent or a principal."

2. Regarding para. 4, this could be strengthened somewhat to give proper guidance as to "posture," by changing the words "to assist in arriving at decisions" to "to promote decisions." It is further suggested that, in the last sentence, the word "implies" be changed to "means."

3. With regard to para. 6, the U.S. Delegation should manifest more positive efforts than merely those of "cooperation" with other Allied Delegations. To this end, this paragraph should be changed to read:

""You should, insofar as is compatible with these instructions, cooperate with the Delegation of France and with the Delegations of other friendly participants in this phase of the Conference ""

4. With regard to para. 7, there appears to be a profoundly important point involved. This point is, in effect, will the United States admit diplomatic defeat and cease to use all means to influence the Conference towards its ends, if the Conference to be going against us. It has been argued that this should be done so as to relieve the U.S. of responsibility and permit the U.S. to pursue, with complete freedom of action, such Rh Rh