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-2- 4287, May 10, 1 p.m., from Paris. is facing is not (repeat not) the Viet Minh rebels, but Communist China. Laniel observed that Communist China had fought the whole UN to a standstill in Korea. Obviously France alone was no (repeat no) match for China. The strength with which the French could oppose Chinese propositions at Geneva would have a direct connection with the amount of support they received from the other Western powers, particularly the US. In the final analysis, the only such support, which he felt would have any real effect on the Chinese, would be the direct threat of US military intervention. He very much feared that the Communist side would attempt so drag out the negotiations by interminable procedural debates on such subjects as the admission to the conference of non-existent Communist Governments of Laos and Cambodia until such time as they could gain a military decision in the field.

Laniel then turned to the immediate military problem. He said that the Viet Minh had announced that they would not (repeat not) cease operations this year during the monsoon. Their next objective, after Dien-Bien-Phu, would in all probability be Hanoi. Under ordinary circumstances it should take the Viet Minh approximately a month to move their troops from Dien-Bien-Phu to the Hanoi area. However, it might be possible to reduce this period to two or three weeks if the Viet Minh made an all-out effort. He also feared that in view of the success which the Chinese have had with their military intervention at Dien-Bien-Phu, they would not (repeat not) now hesitate to intervene further with supplies and even with additional personnel, to the extent necessary to gain a knockout victory at Hanoi.

It therefore was vitally important, as a first order of business, for the French to decide how to re group their forces in Indochina so as best to protect the expeditionary corps. Laniel said that he would much prefer to take these military decisions with the aid of competent US military advice, rather than to take them by himself. He also said that he would have to know, in connection with making his decisions, what, if any, military action the US might be prepared to take in Indochina and under what, if any, circumstances. If there was no (repeat no) possibility of US military help at any point, the regroupment of forces would have to be much more drastic, and the first thing to be done would be the complete evacuation and abandonment to the Viet Minh of the entire territories of Laos and Cambodia. He stated that there were 15 French Union battalions presently in Laos which would have to be redeployed to the Delta or to some area near the sea. In addition, the French-held lines in the Delta would have to be greatly shortened. Rh

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