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lead to our desired objectives. Navarre Plan still sound, but French will for offensive action and even ability govern themselves disintegrated. Following development united action concept and as French military situation deteriorated, we began think of US military intervention. In April 3 meeting with Congressmen agreed objectives of earlier prerequisites must be me to increased degree and other interested nations must join in before such intervention could be authorized. Secretary described London-Paris trip and Eden's reneging on communique. Some adverse Congressional comment on latter and Secretary said thought Nehru had pressured British.

Secretary described two informal French requests for US air intervention on April 4 and 22 and his replies thereto. Described French mood of extreme urgency and British Cabinet confirmation of reversal of agreement in communique of April 13. British terrified by H-bomb, pressured by Nehru, contrasted their giving up India with French call for help to keep Indochina, and gave higher rating to risk of Chinese intervention and global war if West intervened. Secretary reed from memo of conversation in which he had chastised Eden for British stand. Number adverse Congressional comments on Rh