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-2- SECTO 106, May 5, 2 p.m., from Geneva cease-fire. French public desire for cease-fire was emotional and French Government could defend its proposal, even though it would in effect delay any cease-fire for long time if not indefinitely, on grounds that conditions demanded were essential for safety of troops themselves. The continued resistance at BienDien [sic] Bien Phu long after public opinion had discounted its fall had conditioned French opinion to believe its loss would not mean loss of war. He did not exclude possibility of conference calling on opposing forces not to undertake new military operations during negotiations. He assured very lengthy negotiations would be necessary to reach any armistice agreement and felt that during this period Communist uncertainty as to united action of US intervention might be increased.

Allen inquired whether at some stage in proceedings working out of armistice details might be left to combattants themselves as suggested in Colombo communique. Chauvel did not like this idea but said it might be considered. In response to question as to whether he envisaged conference turning into indefinite Panmunjom Chauvel said it might turn armistice negotiations over to working group and adjourn to reconvene when warranted.

In response to Achilles inquiry as to whether "international" meant "UN" supervision, Chauvel stated French had no firm position on this but subsequent discussion indicated French continue to oppose use of UN machinery as establishing precendentprecedent [sic] which would be used against them in North Africa and elsewhere and that British definitely share their point of view. Allen suggested something like peace observation commission would be preferable to UN auspices. Achilles stressed importance of insisting on UN auspices.

Chauvel said studies by French military had confirmed their impression that withdrawal of French Union Forces from Cambodia and Laos except for two bases in latter would be of definite military advantage rather than disadvantage.

JAK:MEJ/14

NOTE: Mr. Hoey's office (PSA) informed 3:15 p.m. 5-5-54 JDP Rh

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