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-2-#DULTE 13, April 27, midnight, from Geneva . They just; did not believe that it was a realizable military exercise considering the military means available. Moreover Eden said it would be most unpopular in Asia let alone with British home opinion.

Eden then asked if our tripartite position was really as bad as I had pointed it. He said he felt that other side was properly worried.

I agreed but said in all frankness they were more worried about United States than British.

Eden did not deny this, and said that we must see how things go here in next few days and do what we can to back French up particularly if Dien Bien Phu falls.

I said I was deeply worried over French situation not alone in its relation with Indochina. NATO was directly affected. The fall of Laniel might result in a left-of-center government coming to power which would exist by Communist sufferance, thereby increasing Communist influence domestically in France and by contagion in Italy which country was also a source of serious concern. I said EDC would be affected, and our entire defense structure In Europe, At this point Bidault arrived and we broke off our conversation.

JEF:11

NOTE: Mr. Gilman (S/S) notified 4/27/54 11 p.m., EH 43814 Rh