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-2- DULTE 9, April 26, 9 p.m., from Geneva general cease-fire lacking any control or safeguards would make it impossible for French Union forces to resume fighting once cease-fire established. Bidault said that the French Government had queried French High Command in Indochina and had received a reply that there would either have to be a final cease-fire or further reenforcementsreinforcements [sic] would have to be sent to Indochina during the conference.

As indicative of Bidualt's continuing courage, he said that when he saw Molotov tomorrow he intended to stand on Laniel's statement of March 5 and attempt to draw Molotov out without ceding ground himself and without getting involved in detailed discussions of substance on an Indochina settlement.

In my judgment, Eden has arrived with instructions actively to encourage French into almost any settlement which will result in cessation hostilities in Indochina. My guess, is that behind this lies British fear that if fighting continues, we will in one way or another become involved, thereby enhancing risk Chinese intervention and possibility further expansion of war. This estimate of mine is confirmed by fact that Chauvel told MacArthur that French believe Eden's instructions are to press actively for a cease-fire.

I made clear to Bidault privately that we would have no (repeat no) part in settlement at Geneva of Indochina war which constituted surrender of Indochina to Communists, and that France has better chance by fighting on rather than by attempted withdrawal which would be under most difficult conditions. I intend to see Eden alone tomorrow morning to talk with extreme bluntness to him expressing my dismay that British are apparently encouraging French In direction surrender which is in conflict not (repeat not) only with out interest but what I conceive theirs to be.

JJL/12 Rh 47171