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2. The action set forth in paragraph 1- above has been referred to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization for appropriate implementation and was dis cussed at the Armed Forces Policy Council on 15 April 1954. The action in paragraph 1- was referred to the Secretary of State.

3. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly prepare the military plans involved under paragraph 1- above. It is further requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in close collaboration, under existing arrangements, with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Supply and Logistics), (Manpower and Personnel) and (Comptroller), promptly develop the supply, manpower and other requirements arising from these military plans which might affect production, manpower and budgetary planning by the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization. This military planning and the development of requirements should cover not only specific intervention in Indochina, but also any augmentations in forces or supplies required to permit the United States to maintain at present levels its present defense commitments and to be prudently prepared to face possible increased risks of (1) Chinese Communist intervention and (2) general war.

4. It is further requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff report to my office on the above by 10 May 1954. If it has not been possible to complete the planning by that date, a progress report on 10 May 1954 is requested.

5. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Supply and Logistics) and (Manpower and Personnel) will collaborate with the Office of Defense Mobilization, as appropriate, in the preparation of production and manpower plans based upon and required to implement the military plans.

6. Because of the security sensitivity of this planning, appropriate security precautions will be taken by all concerned.

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