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4. Should the Communists operate an air force from South China in sufficient strength to jeopardize French retention of the Tonkin delta, the resulting situation would warrant active consideration of implementation of appropriate actions as outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 5405. If and when the introduction of Communist aircraft into the Indochina War appears imminent, the U.S. should initiate talks at a political level as set forth in NSC 5405 to provide for the implementation of the military actions outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 5405.

5. Although there is no reliable evidence to indicate that Communist combat air units, POL, or other aviation supplies have been moved in strength to South China, this could be accomplished without too much difficulty. However, until there is some indication of such an enemy development, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any commitment which restricts or limits freedom of action by the United States would be premature and unwarranted. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the reply to Mr. Pleven indicate that United States action in such a development would depend upon the circumstances.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will acquaint Department of State Representatives with the substance of their views as expressed in this memorandum when the subject of Indochina is again discussed at a State-JCS meeting.

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