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8 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



Introduction of Air Power in Indochina
 * Subject; || U.S. Reaction to Chinese Communist
 * }

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed a memorandum by Department of State Representatives, dated 12 March 1954, subject as above, tabled at the 12 March 1954 State-JCS meeting. In substance, this memorandum requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present their views on the military significance and implications of the following:


 * . The appearance of, and Communist capability of maintaining and supplying, an air force using only airfields in Viet Nam or Laos in the face of French opposition.


 * . The appearance of, and Communist capability of mounting, an air force based principally on airfields in Communist China, and how large a force would be required to counter French defense capabilities.

2. In regard to subparagraph 1, above, there are no indications that the Viet Minh currently possess an air force. Therefore, the appearance of combat aircraft in Minh would warrant the assumption that they were supplied by and operated from Communist China. It is estimated that the Communists, in the face of current French capabilities, could not maintain and supply an air force operating exclusively from airfields in Viet Nam or Laos.

3. In regard to subparagraph 1, above, the Communists have the cap ability of mounting a ersiousserious [sic] air threat to the French with an airforce based principally in South CinaChina [sic]. The French air defense of the Indochina area is inadequate. Consequently, a Communist air force of from 100-200 aircraft (including jet bombers) could readily overcome French air strength in the Tonkin delta and severely affect other French strengths in Indochina. SecDef Cont. No. CopyofCopies

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