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must be worked out with the French. Because the $385 million dollar program includes pay and subsistence of forces of the Associated States, this problem of inspection becomes an even more acute area, since it is proposed that those units will be visited by the MAAG at least once a year to follow up on its implementation.

The major reasons for the lack of program information and logistical back up material within the MAAG are more or less a direct result of the following:

The MAAG members have, in the past, been expected to be experts in relation to requirements for supplies and equipment to logistically support a war for which they have no part in the planning or execution. Not only do they have no part in the planning but the plans, if any, which are prepared by the French are not made known to tho MAAG for the most part until after execution or on crash basis. It is believed that the MAAG has made a valiant attempt based on the limited information provided them to screen and evaluate the requests for supplies and materiel in order to provide the necessary requirements to support the war. Due to the very limited justification presented with requisitions, has in the past been incumbent upon the MAAG to ask the French for additional information prior to recommending approval to Washington. An example of a reply from the French is shown in (Tabs A and A1). The Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces, General Navarre, forwarded a letter (Tab B) to General Trapnell, Chief of the MAAG, which resulted in a cable being forwarded from OSD Nash to the MAAG (Tab C). As a result of the above correspondence and General Navarre's discussion of the situation here with visiting US officials who have given him the impression that all his requests will be granted, this attitude has filtered down though General Navarre's staff to the point that they feel that an official request for equipment or assistance from the French High Command is sufficient justification, and that their needs should not be put to question. The MAAG, as a net result, has become to a great extent a transmission agency for requisitions for supplies and equipment except in those limited areas where MAAG personnel are able to extract reasonable justification from the French. In many cases the MAAG has recommended disapproval of requests and the French have gone to higher authority and gained approval. A recent dispatch from the MAAG to Headquarters USAF in connection with French requests for aircraft support is attached (Tab D) as an illustration of the difficulties under which MAAG action is taken.

The following is a brief analysis of the problem areas and recommendations. It is believed that the following recommendations are essentials if the US is to furnish logistically support for the war in Indochina in a reasonably efficient and economical manner.


 * Since the completion of the 6 February 1954 DCE cost study there have been a number of changes in Force Plan objectives of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Some of the changes wore under advisement at the time of the 6 February report and in those cases where considered

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