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D. The courses of action outlined above are considered as mandatory regardless of the outcome of military operations in Indo-China.


 * (1) If Indo-China is held they are needed to build up strength and resistance to Communism in the entire area.


 * (2) If Indo-China is lost they are essential as partial steps:


 * . To delay as long as possible the extension of Communist domination throughout the Far East, or


 * . In conjunction with offensive operations to retake Indo-China from the Communists.


 * (3) Should Indo-China be lost, it is clear to the Special Committee that the involvement of U.S. resources either in an attempt to stop the further spread of Communism in the Far East, (which is bound, except in terms of the most extensive military and political effort, to be futile) or to initiate offensive operations to retake and reorient Indo-China, (which would involve a major military campaign), will greatly exceed those needed to hold Indo-China before it falls.


 * (4) Furthermore, either of these undertakings (in the light of the major setback to U,S. national policy involved in the loss of Indo-China) would entail as an urgent prerequisite tho restoration of Asian morale and confidence in U,S. policy which will have reached an unprecedentedly low level in the area.


 * (5) Each of these courses of action would involve greater risk of war with Communist China, and possibly the Soviet Union, than timely preventive action taken under more favorable circumstances before Indo-China is lost.

Rh