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2. A specific U.S. psychological warfare program for Indo-China should be developed immediately, including overt and covert projects, under Operations Coordinating Board coordination, with paramount emphasis on the establishment, of a climate of opinion which associates all outside support with the achievement of Indo-Chinese rational aspirations. Benefit will accrue fr㎝ U.S. courses of action in direct proportion to the degree they are implemented through indigenous peoples rather than through direct support of tho French. The U.S. psychological warfare program should therefore provide for the following:


 * . The establishment under tho U.S. Ambassador to Indo-China of an operations advisory group, including representatives of tho U.S Military Mission in Indo-China, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency as appropriate to coordinate the non-military aspects of U.S. psychological operations within Indo-China. The Chief, MAAG, Indo-China, should be responsible for coordinating all psychological warfare activities directly relative to his expanded mission with this group.


 * State, Defense, CIA, FOA, USIA


 * . Appropriate psychological warfare equipment and supplies should be assigned to the French and Vietnam forces, and key technical personnel should be assigned to the MAAG for such use as the Chief, MAAG, may desire.


 * Defense, CIA, FOA

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