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 (F) The U.S. objective in Indo-China should be centralized U.S. control and coordination of all U.S. military, military aid, and "unconventional warfare" (which includes psychological warfare, guerrilla warfare, and certain aspects of pacification operations) mechanisms in Indo-China.

(G) There is in Indo-China, or programmed for Indo-China (and anticipating continued U.S. assistance) a sufficient amount of equipment and supplies and a potential manpower pool sufficient eventually to defeat the Communists decisively if properly utilized and maintained and the situation continues to permit this manpower to be converted into military effectiveness. In their own report the French have acknowledged that US. aid in many areas has exceeded French capacity to absorb it.

(H) Measures advocated by the U.S. must be so characterized by determination, strength, confidence, and justice that they serve to enhance the support of all Asians who seek freedom, both from Communist domination and western colonization. Asians must be convinced that they will have a far better future with the Free World than under Communism and that there is not to be reinstitution of colonialism.

(I) The Communists in Indo-China, Southeast Asia, China, and Moscow must be made aware that the United States, France, and the free governments of the Far East are united, steadfast, and capable of accomplishing their aims.

(J) The U.S. must take the initiative in persuading the French and Vietnamese to overcome these deficiencies. Such initiative must, however, avoid French exploitation in its unilateral interest and must avoid actions which will lead to involuntary U.S. combat participation. Rh