Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.djvu/151

 must be considered a matter of urgency to be implemented without delay. They are also designed to achieve the desired results in Indo-China without overt involvement by U.S. combat forces.

(C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency have developed a program of support for the Navarre Plan in Indo-China. This plan considers certain basic immediate requirements for continued U.S. support for Franco-Vietnamese operations and some of these recommendations have been implemented. The remaining actions have been incorporated hereunder in paragraph III (A). However, there is implicit in many of these proposals a requirement for a stronger French political and military effort as well as more effective support for Vietnamese participation. The alternative to more precise and extensive action by the French and Vietnamese, as proposed by the U.S., appears to be a continued stalemate or debacle in Indo-China.

(D) It would appear that France cannot withdraw her forces from Indo-China without serious deterioration of her position as a world power.

(E) The key to the success of military operations continues to be the generation of well-trained, properly lead indigenous forces effectively employed in combat operations against the Communist forces in Viet Minh. The eventual goal must be the the development of homogeneous indigenous units with a native officer corps. In this the French have had, for whatever reason, insufficient success. Such success will ultimately be dependent upon the inspiration of the local population to fight for their own freedom from Communist domination and the willingness of the French both to take the measures to stimulate that inspiration and to more fully utilize the native potential. At the same time, French sensitivities with respect to their sacrifices, responsibilities, and capabilities must be respected, as we persuade and assist them to correct existing deficiencies. Rh