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 TOP SECRET would wish to assure themselves that the United states was really committed to fully replacing French strength in the area. If they were convinced this was the case, and if the nature of French withdrawal made replacement by U. S. troops practicable, they would support a U. S. effort.

46. : A French decision actually to withdraw would signal a major change in the French position in the world. France might be expected to lose interest in the Far East, to resign itself to a diminution of U. S. assistance and support, and to an abrupt loss of its role as a major power. The French political position in North Africa would be seriously prejudiced. The effect on French policy toward NATO and EDC or in Europe has not been estimated.

47. : The Associated States would be concerned by a French withdrawal largely by reason of the practical obstacles which they would believe would have to be overcome in any replacement of French forces. If convinced, however, that these obstacles could be overcome they would continue to fight in support of U. S., regional, or UN military efforts in Indochina; but the war-weary Indochinese people would be less willing to fight, particularly if intervention comes at a tine when the end of the fighting is otherwise in prospect.

48. :


 * . . Free world reaction would vary. If the French withdrew the rest of the free world would probably prefer UN action to U. S. intervention alone. But,

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