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 TOP SECRET :. . Reactions of other nations, including the participating nations, would be substantially the same as in par. 22 above.

34. : The fact that the United States was initially only one of a group would probably not appreciably reduce Peiping's apprehension at the presence of U. S. power on the southern borders of China. Peiping might well believe that in the end, as in the case of Korea, the situation would evolve into a continuing and largely U. S. unilateral commitment. Thus, the chances of overt Chinese Communist intervention would remain substantial.

35. : Whether or not the other participating powers concurred in U. S. use of nuclear weapons, the chances of Chinese Communist overt intervention would be the same as stated in paragraph 23- above.

36. : In addition to the increased program under A above (par. 24) the United States would probably have to provide additional expenditures for provision of military equipment and supplies to the forces of some of the participating states. Rh TOP SECRET