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 TOP SECRET :the Associated States, it is probable that, though a two-thirds majority might be secured, there would be not more than 36 affirmative votes, and many abstentions. During the course of the debate there would be major efforts to incorporate in the resolution a call for a cease-fire and negotiated settlement, or provisions for limiting the conflict to Indochina. U. S. control of the character of the resolution would be extremely difficult, although not necessarily impossible. In sum, it might be possible to secure UN action for armed assistance to the Associated states, but the difficulties in staving off UN pressure for a negotiated settlement or UN mediation would be considerable. The majority for a satisfactory UN resolution would, at best, be slim and conceivably might take more time to achieve than is available. Failure to obtain UN action, if attempted, would seriously prejudice the prospects of any effective intervention.


 * . . Any regional grouping should enlist maximum Asian participation. It would be possible to develop a regional grouping which would lend moral and some military support to a U. S. intervention in Indochina if it were clear that the United States had decided (1) to undertake the commitment of U. S. forces to the Indochina area, and (2) to assume commitments of a lasting character for the defense of the

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