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 TOP SECRET especially because of seeing U. S. support for French colonialism. The NATO countries, other than those mentioned above, would generally support U. S. military action, but their support would be tempered by fear of expansion of hostilities and the effect on the NATO buildup. The attitude of most of the Latin American countries would tend to be non-committal.

22. : U. S. allies would almost certainly consider that use by the U. S. of nuclear weapons in Indochina (a) would remove the last hope that these weapons would not be used again in war, and (b) would substantially increase the risk of general war. Our allies would, therefore, doubt the wisdom of the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina and this doubt would develop into strong disapproval if nuclear weapons were used without their being consulted or against their wishes. On the other hand, France and, if consulted, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly the Netherlands, might support such action but only if convinced by the U. S. that such action was essential to keep Southeast Asia from falling under Communist control and to preserve the principle of collective security. Other NATO governments, if similarly consulted would probably not publicly disapprove of such U. S. action if they were persuaded during consultation that such action was essential to prevent collapse of the collective security system. Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea would probably approve such action in the hope that this would Rh