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 TOP SECRET increased independence from the French, and would constantly seek to enlist U. S. influence in bolstering their position vis-a-vis France. The Indochinese, however, would be worried over the possibility that U. S. intervention might invite Chinese Communist reaction and make Indochina a battleground of destruction on the Korean scale. Accordingly, they would be expected to oppose the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina.

21. : The U.K., apprehensive of the possibility of war with Communist China, would approve a U. S. intervention in Indochina only if convinced that it was necessary for the prevention of further expansion of Communist power in Asia. Australia and New Zealand would fully support such a U, S. action, and Canada to a lesser extent, Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea would welcome U. S. intervention in Indochina, since both would hope that this would lead to general war between the United States and Communist China. President Rhee, in particular, might be tempted to believe that his chances of involving the United States in a renewal of Korean hostilities were greatly enhanced. Thailand, if assured of U. S. guarantees of adequate permanence would probably permit the use of Thai territory and facilities. The Philippines would support U. S. intervention. Japan would lend unenthusiastic diplomatic support. India and Indonesia strongly, and Ceylon and Burma to a lesser extent, would disapprove U. S. intervention. Other members of the Arab-Asian bloc would be unsympathetic Rh