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 TOP SECRET : To increase the risk of Chinese Communist intervention and, through a series of actions and counteractions, to increase the risk of general war with the USSR.

On balance, the French would prefer to find a solution of the Indochina problem which did not involve U. S. military participation, although such solution might in our opinion risk the ultimate loss of Indochina. In the event of U. S. military participation the French could be expected to attempt progressively to shift the military burden of the war to the United States, either by withdrawing their forces or failing to make good attrition.

20. : The Associated States would not be interested in U. S. intervention unless they were satisfied (1) such intervention would be on a scale which seemed adequate to assure defeat of the Vietminh organized military forces and to deter Chinese Communist aggression, and (2) the United States would assure lasting responsibility for their political independence and territorial integrity. On these terms non-Communist Indochinese leaders would welcome U. S. interventions and would be unlikely to succumb to Communist peace proposals. The war weary Indochinese people, however, might be less favorable, particularly if U. S. intervention came at a time when an end to the fighting seemed otherwise in sight, the Associated States would expect to profit from U. S. intervention in terms of Rh