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TOP SECRET reactions, this annex assures that there will be either:

(1) a French and Associated States invitation to the United States to participate militarily; or (2) an Associated States invitation to the United States after a French decision to withdraw, and French willingness to cooperate in phasing out French forces as U. S. forces are phased in. If neither of these assumptions proved valid the feasibility of U. S. intervention would be vitiated. If the French, having decided on withdrawal and a negotiated settlement, should oppose U. S. intervention and should carry the Associated States with them in such opposition, U. S. intervention in Indochina would in effect be precluded. If, after a French decision to withdraw, the Associated States should appeal for U. S. military assistance but the French decided not to cooperate in the phasing in of U. S. forces, a successful U. S. intervention would be very difficult.

5. The third issue is whether the United States should intervene with combat forces rather than allow Indochina to be lost to the Communists, and which alternative it should select?


 * . U. S. commitment of combat forces would involve strain on the basic western coalition, increased risk of war with China and of general war, high costs in U. S.

TOP SECRETRh