Page:Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc.pdf/15

 Minnesota should recognize a cause of action for negligent credentialing. Id. at 303. In deciding whether to recognize a common law tort, the Minnesota Supreme Court used a four-part analysis, the first part being whether the tort of negligent credentialing was inherent in, or the natural extension of, a well-established common-law right. Id. at 304. Because we answer this question in the negative, we need proceed no further with the Larson analysis. We hold, in short, that we do not find it necessary to create a new tort in order to provide a party with another remedy against a hospital premised on physician credentialing. See Goff, 342 Ark. 143, 150, 27 S.W.3d 387, 391. We affirm the circuit court on this point. Because we decline to recognize a cause of action for negligent credentialing, we need not address NMC's claim of immunity under the Arkansas Peer Review Statute or the federal HQIA.

Moreover, NMC would not be liable for the tort of an employee of an independent contractor like Richard. See, e.g., Stoltze, 354 Ark. at 607, 127 S.W.3d at 470 ("The general rule is that an employer is not responsible for the negligence of his or her independent contractor."). The Paulinos acknowledged in their complaint that Richard was an employee of AIM. Accordingly, we reject their contention that she should be considered the independent contractor instead of AIM.

With regard to the tort of outrage, we agree with the circuit court that the facts alleged, and particularly the absence of a causative link between NMC and the injury to Mrs. Paulino based on negligent credentialing, did not rise to the level of outrage. See Crockett v. Essex, 341 Ark. 558, 563, 19 S.W.3d 585, 589 (2000) (finding that this court gives a narrow